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optimum utilisation of fisheries. Consequently, the LOSC required coastal States that were incapable of 
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states to Pacific island coastal States. The study reports on the differing interpretations, and the 
complications that have subsequently arisen, of coastal State jurisdiction and its obligations to ensure 
optimum utilisation. The study demonstrates that EEZs, despite allocating fishing rights to Pacific island 
coastal States, have changed little in real terms and distant water fishing States continue to reap the 
largest benefit from resources within these EEZs. 
Keywords 
exclusive, developing, economic, island, states, who, really, gets, all, fish, zones, pacific 
Disciplines 
Arts and Humanities | Law 
Publication Details 
Q. A. Hanich & B. M. Tsamenyi, 'Exclusive economic zones and Pacific developing island states - who 
really gets all the fish?' (Paper presented at the Sharing the Fish 2006, Perth, Western Australia, March). 
This conference paper is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/209 
 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS 
AND PACIFIC SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES: WHO REALLY 
GETS ALL THE FISH? 
 
 
Quentin Hanich  -  Centre for Maritime Policy.  University of Wollongong.  
qah721@uow.edu.au
 





The declaration of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) was the most significant 
reallocation of fisheries property rights of the 20th Century and resulted in the  transfer 
of  property rights for 90% of the world’s then active fisheries to coastal States, many 
of whom were developing island States. The philosophical basis of the EEZ regime, 
as a mechanism to achieve a new international economic order for developing coastal 
States, has failed to deliver real change for a number of reasons. Using the 
experiences of Pacific small islands developing States in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean as a case study, this paper shows that the declarations of EEZs by these 
States has not matched the original  economic expectations. The paper discusses some 
of these reasons in the context of Pacific small island developing States and discusses 
opportunities to achieve the original intentions behind the EEZ concept. 
 
KEYWORDS: Pacific Island States, Fisheries Access, Western and Central Pacific 




The declaration of exclusive economic zones as a result of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), was the most significant reallocation of 
fisheries property rights of the 20th Century. The EEZ regime resulted in the transfer 
of property rights for 90% of the world’s then active fisheries. These property rights 
were transferred from the international commons (‘freedom of the seas’),1 to coastal 
States, many of whom were developing island States. 
 
The philosophical basis of the EEZ regime, as a mechanism to achieve a new 
international economic order for developing coastal States, has failed to deliver the 
expected changes for many, if not most, developing coastal States. Using the 
experiences of Pacific small island developing States as a case study, this paper shows 
that the declarations of EEZs by these States has not matched the original  economic 
expectations. The paper provides reasons to show why this is the case and discusses 
opportunities to achieve the original intentions behind the EEZ concept. 
                                                 
1 Grotius, Hugo. 1916. The Freedom of the Seas. New York. Oxford University Press. Grotius wrote the ‘Freedom 
of the Seas’ in 1604-5. The 1916 publication cited is a translation of the Latin text. Grotius argued that the oceans 
were the common property of all, particularly in regard to freedom of navigation and trade. This countered 
sovereign claims by Spain over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, and by Portugal over the Indian Ocean. 
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THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CONCEPT 
The traditional legal framework for the exploitation of marine living resources was 
based on the principle of freedom of access. Under this regime, oceans were divided 
into two distinct zones: the territorial seas, and the high seas.  The territorial sea, 
which in most cases was three nautical miles in breadth, constituted the limit of 
coastal States fisheries special rights. Beyond three nautical miles, the high seas were 
free to any and all. The freedom of fishing concept had two implications for the 
regulation of fisheries.  First, coastal States as such did not have any special rights to 
the fisheries resources of the oceans beyond the narrow limit of the territorial sea.  
Second, the concept undermined effective conservation of the living resources of the 
oceans through its inherent tendency to create a ‘tragedy of the commons’.2
 
This legal framework changed in the 1970s as the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) negotiated a comprehensive multilateral treaty 
to regulate the use of the seas.3 This process, and the State practices generated by it, 
resulted in the development, amongst other things, of the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) concept. In regard to most marine fisheries, the EEZ regime4 displaced the old 
doctrine of high seas freedoms and brought under national jurisdiction large tracts of 
ocean space that previously belonged to the regime of the high seas:  
 
‘Under the new regime of the seas, the world community has willed to the Coastal States the 
bulk of living resources in waters off their shores.’5  
 
However, this inheritance came with strings attached. The LOSC describes the 
expectations placed on coastal States by the world community in regard to their EEZ. 
The expectations are couched in terms of three important obligations: conservation; 
optimum utilization; and a duty to co-operate.  
 
Firstly, article 61 requires coastal States to manage and conserve fisheries within their 
EEZs. They are required to determine the allowable catch of the living resources in 
their EEZ and to ensure, through ‘proper’ conservation and management measures, 
that living resources within the EEZ are not over-exploited.6
 
Secondly, article 62 obliges coastal States to share their surplus fish and promote the 
objective of optimum utilisation of living resources within their EEZ (without 
prejudice to the conservation requirements described in Article 61). This reflected the 
concerns of distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) that coastal States would 
drastically limit utilisation of living resources within their EEZs. Recognising that 
many developing States did not have the capacity to ‘optimally harvest’ their EEZs, 
coastal States are obliged to calculate their capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch of their EEZ and are obliged to give other States access to any surplus beyond 
                                                 
2 Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. In Science. Vol. 162. 13 December 1968. pp1243-1248. 
3The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, hereafter LOSC, text to be found at 21 ILM (1982) pp. 1261-1354.  
4 See Part V, LOSC 
5  Hamlisch, R., 1988. Methodology and guidelines for fisheries development planning (with special reference to 
the developing countries in the African region). FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. (297). 
6 Further, article 61 also states that any such measures should be based on the best available scientific advice and 
be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield. However, of particular relevance to Pacific island States, article 61 gives coastal States wide 
flexibility to determine these measures and allows that they may be qualified by environment and economic factors, 
including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States. 
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which their fleets could harvest. However, the LOSC did give coastal States wide 
discretion in determining this surplus and the conditions for foreign access.7
 
Thirdly, articles 63 and 64 oblige coastal States and DWFNs to cooperate in regard to 
straddling and migratory fish stocks8 that occur within their EEZ, or whose vessels 
fish for the same stocks on the high seas. These States shall cooperate, either directly, 
or through fora such as regional fisheries management organisations, and ensure the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of same stocks throughout their range.9
 
It was assumed that the granting of sovereign rights to coastal States over their EEZs 
would significantly benefit coastal States, at some cost to DWFNs who previously 
had fished these stocks (either through displaced effort or requirement to pay access 
fees). However in practice, DWFNs still control the key aspects of the global fisheries 
trade: technology; finance; trade (including access to the most lucrative markets); and 
production of the final end uses. DWFN continue to maximise and maintain their 
control inherent in their positioning at the end of the production cycle.10  
 
WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC TUNA FISHERIES 
DWFNs continued to dominate many EEZ fisheries. This is starkly illustrated in the 
Western and Central Pacific (WCPO) tuna fisheries where DWFNs continue to catch 
up to 90%11 of the regional tuna resources, despite roughly 41%12 of the catch 
originating from the EEZs of the region’s small island developing States.13  
 
The WCPO is home to the world’s richest and largest tuna fishery14 which migrates 
across, and straddles, both high seas and EEZs. This tuna fishery is different from 
tuna fisheries in the Atlantic, Indian and Eastern Pacific Oceans in that more than half 
of the region occurs within EEZs, thereby granting coastal States sovereign rights 
over the majority of the fishery. The combined EEZs of the Pacific island States cover 
roughly 30,569,000 km², equivalent to about 28% of all EEZs globally.15
 
                                                 
7 Article 62.3: In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the Coastal State 
shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living resources of the area 
to the economy of the Coastal State concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 (rights 
of landlocked States) and 70 (rights of geographically disadvantaged States), the requirements of developing States 
in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States 
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks. 
8 Straddling and highly migratory stocks may simultaneously straddle waters both within and beyond the EEZ, or 
may migrate back and forth across EEZ boundaries. Consequently, catches of these stocks on either side of an EEZ 
will affect the same stock with direct impacts on both coastal fishing fleets and high seas fishing fleets. 
9 Article 64 also requires States to cooperate, in regions were there is no appropriate organisation, to establish such 
an organisation (i.e RFMO) and participate in its operation. 
10 Stokke, 1991. "Transnational Fishing: Japan's changing strategy" 15 Marine Policy  (1991) pp. 231-243. 
11 Tarte, Sandra. 1999. Negotiating a Tuna Management Regime for the Western and Central Pacific: The MHLC 
Process 1994-1999. In The Journal of Pacific History. Vol 34. No. 3. pp273-280. 
12 Hampton, John. 2005. Tuna Fisheries and their Impacts in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community. http://www.spc.org.nc/artImpact%20of%20tuna%20fisheries.htm
13 Within the context of this article, ‘Pacific Island States’ refers to independent members of the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (except for Australia and New Zealand): Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu. 
14 The WCPO tuna fishery in 2004 was 51% of the global tuna catch of just under 4 million tonnes. Report of the 
First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 2005. WCPFC. 
15 Gillett, Robert. 2005. Pacific Island Countries Region. In Review of the State of World Marine Resources. FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper 457. Rome. FAO. Pp144—157.  
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In 2004, the WCPO purse seine, pole and line, longline, and troll tuna fisheries (plus 
some limited artisanal fishing in Indonesia and the Philippines) caught an estimated 
2,021,773 tonnes16 of tuna with an estimated delivered value of more than US$2.5 
billion.17 The two key fisheries are purse seine and longline.18  
 
Over-capacity within the WCPO tuna fisheries is a growing concern as it is 
undermining the long term sustainability of some aspects of the fishery. In 2004, there 
were over 6,061 vessels actively fishing within the WCPFC statistical area: including 
4,365 longliners; 1,297 pole and liners; and 399 purse seiners.19
 
Some fishing practices, such as fish aggregating devices and purse seine catches of 
juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, are impacting upon fish stocks and undermining the 
profitability of the fishery. Economic studies have also shown that fishing effort is 
significantly above optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability of the fishery.20
 
Overfishing is likely to be occurring for both yellowfin and bigeye, though neither 
stock is currently overfished.21 The Scientific Committee of the newly formed 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission22 (Commission) recommended in 
August 2005 that fishing mortality for bigeye and yellowfin be reduced by roughly 
20%. In December 2005, the Commission agreed to restrain purse seine efforts to 
2004 levels (highest on record), or the average of 2001-2004 levels, and to restrain 
longline catches to 2004 levels, or the average of 2001-2004 levels.23 The 
Commission also agreed to look at measures in 2006 to further reduce catch and effort. 
 
                                                 
16 Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 2005. WCPFC. 
17 Estimate does not include the additional value of the troll or artisanal gears fisheries which made up 11% of all 
catches. Estimates sourced from the Report of the First Regular Session of Scientific Committee. 2005. WCPFC.  
18 The purse seine fishery is most significant in terms of tonnage: 1,263,161 tonnes or 62% of the total 2004 
WCPO tuna catch. This was worth an estimated US$1,158,000,000 (delivered value). Purse seine vessels target 
skipjack (1,059,061 tonnes or 84% of catch) and yellowfin (179,310 tonnes or 14% of catch) for canning but also 
record an important by-catch of bigeye (24,790 tonnes or 2% of catch). Longline fishery is far smaller in terms of 
tonnage, but is almost equal in value due to the higher value of product. 2004 longline catch was 225,786 tonnes or 
11% of the total WCPO tuna catch and was worth an estimated US$1,059,000,000 (delivered value). Longliners 
target bigeye (84,394 tonnes) and high quality yellowfin (70,757 tonnes) for sashimi. The albacore longline fishery 
catches 65,865 tonnes which are sold as premium ‘white meat’ canned product. The domestic fisheries of 
Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam also take large catches of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye with high proportions 
of juvenile tuna. Data is sourced from the Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 2005. 
WCPFC. And: Hampton, John. 2005. Tuna Fisheries and their Impacts in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community. http://www.spc.org.nc/artImpact%20of%20tuna%20fisheries.htm
19 Analysis of 2004 WCPFC Tuna Fishery Yearbook reveals 6,061 vessels fishing in the WCPFC statistical area: 
4,365 longliners, 1,297 pole and liners and 399 purse seiners. Data on trollers was unavailable. Of these vessels: 
65% (3958) were flagged to the key distant water fishing States: China, Japan, Korea, Spain, Chinese Taipei and 
the USA; 6% (370) were from Pacific small island States developing States: Cook Islands , Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu; and, 
29% (1737) were from Australia, NZ, Indonesia, Philippines, American Samoa and the French territories of French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia. Reference is Lawson, Timothy (ed) 2004. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2004. Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Noumea. 
20 Bertignac, Michel., Campbell, Harry., Hampton, John., and Hand, Anthony. 2001. Maximising Resource Rent 
from the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries. In Marine Resource Economics. Vol. 15. pp151-177. 
21 Report of the First Regular Session of the Scientific Committee. 2005. WCPFC.  
22 Negotiations for the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPFC) were completed in 2000 with the Convention entering into force in 
July 2004. Objective of WCPFC is ‘... to ensure, through effective management, the long term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean in 
accordance with the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.’ The 
Convention established a annual Commission, and a secretariat headquartered in FSM. 
23 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 2005. Conservation and Management Measures for Bigeye 
and Yellowfin in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Conservation and Management Measure 2005-03.  
 4
PACIFIC ISLANDS, THE EEZ  AND TUNA FISHERIES  
Tuna fisheries have long been viewed as the primary development opportunity for 
many Pacific island developing states.  These island States are some of the poorest 
and smallest States in the world. For some, their EEZ tuna resources are their only 
significant resource and are vital to their national well being.  Pacific island States 
depend upon these stocks: as a traditional and important source of food; as a critical 
form of revenue (US$60-70 million in access fees); employment (25,000 regional 
jobs); and income (expenditure by locally based vessels is worth US$130 million).24
 
In 1999 the combined annual tuna catch was equivalent in value to approximately 
11% of the combined GDP of FFA member Pacific island States 25 while revenue 
from tuna can contribute up to 42% of gross domestic product26 (Kiribati and Tuvalu). 
The access fees from these fisheries are significant components of national economies 
for 7 of the 14 Pacific island States.27  
 
‘These tuna resources of the area are enormous in relation to the national economies (of the 
Pacific small island developing States). A purse seine vessel, in a single haul can capture 
enough tuna to match the value of a year’s exports from one of the smaller countries.’28
 
A key issue for the management and exploitation of their EEZs is the inherent 
migratory nature of tuna and their strong spatial and temporal variability due to their 
close association with the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) Index.29 ENSO 
events shift the Pacific equatorial warm pool back and forth (east-west) across EEZs 
and high seas. As the warm pool moves, so too do the associated tuna stocks, and the 
fishing fleets.30 This directly impacts upon the revenue that Island States can raise 
from fishing within their EEZs as it increases or decreases their catch rates, and the 
consequent value of access fees and domestic fisheries, depending upon whether 
ENSO favours their specific EEZ or not. 
 
WHO GETS WHAT? 
There is no doubt that EEZs have brought Pacific island States some benefits and 
increased economic opportunities. Access fees deliver needed financial contributions 
to governments, while domestically-based fishing fleets and support industries. 
pump hard currency into national economies. The EEZs have also become an 
important motivation for DWFNs to donate foreign aid into the Pacific. For example, 
fisheries access was the original motivation for one of the region’s largest donors, 
Japan, and continues to be a major factor driving its Pacific aid policies.31 In 1998-99, 
Japan donated approximately US$152.7 million of bi-lateral aid to the region.32  
                                                 
24 Gillett, Robert., McCoy, Mike., Rodwell, Len. And Tamate, Josie. 2001. Tuna. A Key Economic Resource in the 
Pacific Island Countries. A Report Prepared for the Asian Development Bank and the Forum Fisheries Agency.  
25 Gillett, Robert., McCoy, Mike., Rodwell, Len. And Tamate, Josie. 2001.  
26 Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. The Contribution of fisheries to the economies of Pacific Island Countries. 
Report prepared for Asian Development Bank, Forum Fisheries Agency and World Bank. 
27 Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. 
28 Gillett, Robert., McCoy, Mike., Rodwell, Len. And Tamate, Josie. 2001.  
29 Cartwright, I. and Willock, A. 1999. Oceana’s Birthwright; the role of rights-based management in tuna fisheries 
of the Western and Central Pacific. Paper presented to the FishRights 99 Conference, Perth. Australia. 11-19 
November, 1999.. 
30 Lehodey, P., Bertignac, M., Hampton, J., Lewis, A., and Picaut, J.El Nino Southern Oscillation and Tuna in the 
Western Pacific. In Nature. Vol. 389. 16 October 1997. 
31 Tarte, Sandra, 1997. Diplomatic Strategies: The Pacific Islands and Japan. Pacific Economic Paper No. 269. 
July 1997. Australia-Japan Research Centre. 
32 Petersen, Elisabeth. 2003. The catch in trading fishing access for foreign aid. In Marine Policy. 27. pp219-228.  
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However, despite the Island States holding sovereign rights to the majority of the 
fishing grounds, 90%33 of tuna from EEZs continues to be caught by DWFNs. Their 
vessels operate through access agreements and other arrangements that historically 
have returned more economic benefits to the DWFN vessels than the island States.34 
By all measures, island States struggle to earn a reasonable return from their EEZs. 
• Approximately 10% or less of catch35 is taken by vessels from Pacific island 
States, despite roughly 41 % of the catch coming from their EEZs. 
• Approximately 6% of fishing vessels active in the region are flagged36 to 
Pacific island States (this includes the controversial Taiwanese owned vessels 
flagged to Vanuatu, Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea).37 
• Approximately 3.5 - 6% (roughly $60-70 million) of the delivered value of the 
catch is returned to Pacific island States through access fees. 38 This is low in 
context of other access arrangements reported elsewhere.39  
 
While DWFN have won the lions share of the benefits, Pacific island States bear the 
costs of managing the tuna fisheries, either directly or through the use of aid donor 
funds which could have been spent on other projects of benefit to Island States.40 This 
is a heavy burden for small governments with little capacity and minimal finances.41
 
WHY EEZS HAVE FAILED TO DELIVER 
There are some critical reasons that prevent Pacific island States from benefiting fully 
from the tuna fisheries within their EEZs. These include: 
 
Lack of Basic Agreement on the Rules of EEZs 
Deep divisions between DWFNs and coastal States were exposed during the 
UNCLOS negotiations regarding the management and allocation of fishing rights 
within EEZs. These divisions have never been effectively resolved and have carried 
through into negotiations of other important fisheries fora such as the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement42 and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention.43
                                                 
33 Cartwright, I. and Willock, A. 1999.  
34 Gillet, Robert. 2005.  
35 90% is taken by DWFN leaving 10% or less for Pacific Island States. Tarte, Sandra. 1999.  
36 Whether these vessels are in fact ‘beneficially owned’ by citizens or companies from Pacific Island States is 
another question. It is quite possible that many of these vessels are in fact owned by DWFN interests operating 
through locally based companies in Pacific Island States or through joint ventures.  
37 Analysis of Lawson, Timothy (ed) 2004. 
38 These figures are difficult to verify due to confidentiality requirements and varying methods of revenue 
recognition. Further, the figure may not reflect the associated aid arrangements that often accompany the fee. The 
figures quoted comes from: Bertignac, Michel., Campbell, Harry., Hampton, John., and Hand, Anthony. 2001. And 
Lewis, Tony. 2004. A Review of Current Access Arrangements in Pacific Developing Member Countries (PDMCs). 
Another important source on access fees is Gillet, R. and Lightfoot, C. 2001. 
39 Petersen, Elisabeth. 2003. 
40 Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries Management Project. 2004. United Nations Development Programme and 
Forum Fisheries Agency. Honiara. 
41 The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 in Honiara, to assist Pacific Island States to manage 
their fishery resources within their EEZs. The FFA has established regional monitoring, control and surveillance 
measures such as  its Vessel Monitoring System as part of this program. The FFA comprises 17 member 
governments: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
42 Full title is Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. 
43 Full title is Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean 
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DWFN argue that tuna are migratory and therefore management should be applied 
throughout their range – whether EEZ or high seas. Additionally, they argue that 
allocations should be principally calculated on fishing history and attributed to the 
relevant flag State, regardless of where these catches occurred. They refer to the 
freedom of the seas principle and the primacy of the flag State within the LOSC.  
 
Coastal States argue that they hold sovereign rights over fish stocks within their EEZs, 
and that these sovereign rights exist regardless of whether the fish stocks are 
migratory or discrete. While coastal States agree that management should be 
consistently applied across the range of the stocks, they retain their Law of the Sea 
right to manage stocks within their EEZs, and argue that allocations should be 
principally attributed to the zone where the catch was taken, regardless of whether the 
catch was taken by foreign flagged vessels or domestic vessels. 
 
The issue is further complicated by equity and power imbalances inherent in resource 
disputes between developing and developed States. In this instance, the developed 
DWFNs with their capital, technology and access to wealthy markets, have 
historically caught most fish. Developing States, often ex-colonies with previous 
experience of losing resources to foreign capitals, have little fishing history and 
struggle to build history due to limited capital, technology and access to key markets.  
 
Ongoing tension over rights to manage and exploit migratory stocks within EEZs 
undermines cooperation. This is evident in DWFN efforts to undermine coastal State 
management of EEZs and their history of opposition to the introduction of monitoring, 
control and surveillance measures for DWFN vessels.44 This also promotes 
antagonism between DWFN and coastal States. 
 
The unequal bi-lateral power relationships between DWFN and island States  
undermine regional attempts to bolster management as DWFN successfully pressure 
individual island States to not impose regionally agreed measures, such as minimum 
terms and conditions, as conditions of access on DWFN vessels.45 In the 1980s these 
tensions also resulted in open illegal fishing by DWFNs.46  
 
Perhaps of most concern, the dispute continues within the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (Commission). Negotiations for the WCPFC were unable to 
find agreement on how to address the management and allocation of stocks across 
EEZs and the high seas, so the Convention was intentionally left ambiguous to enable 
both interpretations to be supported.47 This effectively left the question unresolved 
and will likely stall progress within the WCPFC until agreement can be reached. 
                                                 
44 Tarte, Sandra. 1999. 
45 Tarte, Sandra. 1999. 
46 During the 1980s, the USA refused to recognise Pacific Island States jurisdiction over migratory tuna stocks 
within their EEZs. The USA argued that as the Pacific Island States were not willing to negotiate management of 
tuna within their EEZs (a contentious interpretation of article 64 of the LOSC), the USA was not required to 
respect their claims. This position was later reversed in the late 1980s when ‘strategic interests’ caused the USA to 
review its opposition to EEZ rights over migratory fish stocks and to negotiate a multi-lateral treaty with Pacific 
Island States that significantly benefited Pacific Island States through generous access fees and granted EEZ access 
to USA tuna fishers.  
47 Aqorau, Transform. 2001. Tuna fisheries management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: A critical 
analysis of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
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Lack of Balance in Negotiations of Access Fees  
The superior negotiating position of DWFNs48 combined with a reluctance on the part 
of Pacific Island States to collaborate on access fee negotiations (and a lack of 
transparency) frustrates attempts to increase the return from access fees. This is 




The issue is further complicated by the often strong ties between access fees and 
foreign aid. Some economists argue that the amount of foreign aid received in 
exchange for cheap fishing access is not worth the aid dependency that has developed. 
They propose that if attention were focused on increasing access fees, rather than tied 
aid packages, access fees could potentially equal or exceed the current aid and access 
package.49 This could also have positive governance and infrastructure benefits given 
the extensive history of failed aid projects.50 Some economists also argue that access 
fees are low when compared with access fees paid elsewhere.51  
 
Lack of Economic Opportunity: Small Fish in a Big Ocean 
Industrial tuna fishing is by nature a high risk, high skilled and capital intensive 
industry (particularly purse seine). By the late 1980s when Pacific island States first 
started seriously considering establishing their own tuna industries (partly in response 
to ongoing low access fees), the global tuna industry was entering a period of low 
profitability and high competition which continues to the present day. Island States 
discovered that they had access to the fish, but not the far more lucrative distribution 
and retail parts of the industry.  
 
In sum, by the time the Pacific Islanders were ready to invest, tuna harvesting and canning had 
become unprofitable, but going into raw material trading or retail/distribution, which were 
profitable activities, was not a serious option for the Pacific Island countries. The other players 
in these nodes were large, established, and diversified multi-national corporations with deep 
pockets, against which the PICs (Pacific Island Countries) did not stand a chance – even if 
they could have come up with the capital. ... By investing in fishing boats and gear, however, 
the PICs were sinking their money into the most competitive, risky, and low profit part of the 
commodity chain.52
 
Beyond Maximum Economic Yield: Undervalued Resource Rents 
The Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries are currently operating beyond their 
economic optimal. Over-capacity, over-fishing and economically inefficient fishing 
practices (such as purse seiners catching juvenile bigeye) are significantly 
undermining the profitability, and therefore the potential resource rent of the fishery. 
It has been estimated that the resource rent for the fishery would be maximised for the 
FFA region53 if total fishing effort was reduced by approximately 50 per cent.54
                                                                                                                                            
and Central Pacific Ocean and its implications for the Pacific Island States. In The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law. Vol 16. No 3. pp379-431. 
48 Pretes, Michael. and Petersen, Elisabeth. 2004. Rethinking fisheries policy in the Pacific. In Marine Policy. 28. 
pp297-309. 
49 Petersen, Elisabeth. 2003. 
50 Tarte, Sandra. 1997. 
51 Pretes, Michael. and Petersen, Elisabeth. 2004. 
52 Schurman, Rachel. 1998. Tuna Dreams: resource Nationalism and the Pacific Island’s Tuna Industry. In 
Development and Change. Vol. 29. pp107-136. 
53 Model was based upon FFA member’s EEZ excluding Aust/NZ, and included the enclosed high seas between. 
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In the current economically inefficient conditions, is unlikely that access fees based 
solely on commercial considerations would achieve much more than 6 – 8% of the 
landed value of the catch55 (still more than currently paid). However, if reforms were 
introduced such as effort and capacity limits, then it is possible that access fees could 
be significantly increased to take advantage of the higher value of the resource rent.56
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
With one notable exception, (US Multi-Lateral Treaty) the returns from DWFN 
fishing within island State EEZs have been less than hoped. The history of bilateral 
negotiations between DWFNs and Pacific island States demonstrates that bilaterals 
play to DWFN strengths and enable DWFN to ‘divide and conquer’ island States.57
 
Whereas when Pacific island States negotiate multi-laterally, they do so from a 
position of strength because together they control access to necessary fishing grounds. 
This is demonstrated by the USA multi-lateral treaty where Pacific island States 
achieved far higher access fees and cooperation.58  
 
Distant water fishing fleets depend upon access to EEZs for their financial viability. 
No surface fishing fleet, distant water or locally based, can profitably operate pole and 
line or purse seine vessels without some access to the island State EEZs.59  
 
The key lesson is that Pacific island States must play to their strengths if they wish to 
increase their return from their EEZs. Future access fee negotiations should be 
transparent, multi-lateral and should play DWFNs against each other to maximise the 
highest returns and strongest compliance.60  
 
Successful implementation of the various newly proposed economic and management 
strategies, such as the PNA Vessel Day Scheme, all depend upon island States 
protecting the value of their sovereign rights though regional cooperation. While this 
will likely require some sharing of benefits and costs to make it attractive to all parties, 
the increased value of the fishery should ensure that all stakeholders receive a long 
term increase beyond any short term benefit from a go-it-alone strategy. 
 
The WCPO tuna fishery is currently an ‘open access’ fishery. While some regional61 
and national measures to limit fishing effort and capacity within EEZs have occurred, 
the lack of restraint and regulation across the range of the stocks, including high seas, 
                                                                                                                                            
54 Bertignac, Michel., Campbell, Harry., Hampton, John., and Hand, Anthony. 2001. 
55 Lewis, Tony. 2004.  
56 Bertignac, Michel., Campbell, Harry., Hampton, John., and Hand, Anthony. 2001. 
57 Good discussions of some of  the issues in bilateral negotiations between DWFN and Pacific island States can be 
found in: Schurman, Rachel. 1998. -  Tarte, Sandra. 1999. - Barclay, Kate. and Cartwright, Ian. 2006. 
58 The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States was negotiated multi-laterally and signed in 1988. The Treaty governs access for USA purse seiners 
to all FFA member’s EEZs and includes catch reporting and other requirements. Access fees from the USA multi-
lateral are far higher (exceeding 20% of landed value) than bilateral access fees with other DWFNs (3.5% to 6%). 
59 Van Santen, G. and Muller, P. 2000. Working apart or together: the case for a common approach to 
management of tuna resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific Island Countries. Pacific Island States 
Discussion Paper Series (10). World Bank. Washington. 
60 These include other concepts proposed by Pretes, Michael. and Petersen, Elisabeth. 2004 – Parris, Hannah. and 
Grafton, Quentin. R. 2006. Tuna-Led Sustainable Development in the Pacific. Draft. -  Barclay, Kate. and 
Cartwright, Ian. 2006. - Pretes, Michael. and Petersen, Elisabeth. 2004. 
61 The Palau Arrangement. 
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is undermining the long term sustainability of the most valuable species (bigeye and 
yellowfin) and devaluing the fishery through economic overfishing and overcapacity. 
 
The new tuna Commission offers island States the opportunity to protect the long term 
sustainability of the fishery and increase their economic return through increasing its 
profitability, though not necessarily by increasing their catch. DWFNs and Pacific 
island States will need to cooperate closely at the Commission to reduce effort and 
capacity to sustainable levels and optimise the economic efficiency of the fishery.  
 
To achieve this, parties will need to look beyond short term national self-interest and 
develop long term co-operative strategies that reflect the migratory and multi-gear 
nature of the fishery. These strategies will necessarily be creative and must share both 
benefits and burdens across the region to ensure widespread support and 
implementation.  Bigeye conservation proposals may save bigeye from over-fishing 
and increase the profitability of the longline fishery, but will create winners and losers, 
and therefore risk failure, unless agreement is reached to share the benefits of the 
reforms (increased catch per unit effort for longline bigeye fleets) and the burden 
(potential decreases in catch per unit of effort for purse seine fleets). 
 
Success will require trust and the development of collective goals; both environmental 
and economic. This will require a resolution of the fundamental dispute over rights to 
migratory fish stocks within EEZs. This is necessary to ensure that both groups feel 
satisfied that they will achieve more out of the process than they lose. 
 
Pacific island States naturally wish to expand their participation in the tuna fishery.62 
The question for island States is how to increase their return from the fishery through 
maximising the value of their EEZs and guaranteeing their future economic value. 
 
Pacific island States should work through the WCPFC, FFA and the PNA towards a 
goal of conserving the tuna fisheries and optimising their economic efficiency. 
Objectives that support this include: 
• Reduce fishing mortality to sustainable levels. 
• Reduce fishing effort to economically optimal levels. 
• Restructure fishing industry to optimise economic returns and avoid 
environmentally unsustainable methods 
• Negotiate transparent multi-lateral access agreements that work to the island 
States advantage (their control of roughly two thirds of the fishery). 
• Develop resource sharing agreements that equitably share the benefits and 
burdens across participants. 
 
Finally, achieving these objectives will require regional unity, firstly amongst the 
island States, and secondly with DWFNs. This will require that island States clarify 
their national objectives to the extent necessary to guarantee long term policy stability 
and avoid regionally damaging policy reversals in response to DWFN pressure. 
                                                 
62 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 2005. Summary Record. 
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